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We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types
and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of “congru-
ence.” We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are sat-
isﬁed when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distri-
bution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities
are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with
the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the
mechanism. For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of
efﬁcient bargaining when the status quo speciﬁes the expected efﬁcient decision
provided that the total surplus is convex in the decision.
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1. Introduction
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ﬁrst demonstrated, in a bilateral trading setting, that
participation constraints may make it impossible for parties who have private informa-
tiontobargaintofullyefﬁcienttrade. Speciﬁcally,theyshowedthatwhenasellerownsa
good that a buyer may wish to purchase, and the parties’ privately known valuations are
statistically independent, under very weak conditions no efﬁcient, Bayesian incentive-
compatible and budget-balanced mechanism can satisfy the parties’ interim participa-
tion constraints.1
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Subsequently, the literature has asked whether efﬁcient bargaining can arise for
some status quo allocations (that is, allocations of ex ante “property rights”). Cramton
et al. (1987) ﬁrst showed that in the problem of allocating a divisible good to the highest
value agent, efﬁciency can be achieved with symmetric agents when the status quo allo-
cation of the good is close enough to equal shares. Schmitz (2002), Che (2006), Figueroa
and Skreta (2007), Yenmez (2007),a n dGershkov and Schweinzer (2010) provide other
examples in which efﬁcient bargaining is possible. Schweizer (2006, Proposition 2) es-
tablishes the existence of an efﬁciency-permitting status quo allocation in a more gen-
eralmodelthantheonesstudiedinthepaperscitedabove. Neeman(1999),Ornelasand
Turner (2007),a n dTurner (2008) construct examples in which an efﬁciency-permitting
status quo allocation does not exist. Fieseler et al. (2003) and Jehiel and Pauzner (2006)
study efﬁciency-permitting status quo allocations in some settings with interdependent
values.
This paper describes a simple status quo allocation that assures the satisfaction of
participation constraints in a very general model. Namely, we study Bayesian incentive-
compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interde-
pendent values that satisfy a form of “congruence.” We show that in any such mech-
anism, interim participation constraints are satisﬁed when the status quo is the ran-
domized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the
mechanism. Furthermore, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead
satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected
equilibrium allocation in the mechanism.
For the case of quasilinear utilities, these observations imply the possibility of ef-
ﬁcient bargaining when the status quo speciﬁes the expected efﬁcient decision, in a
setting that strictly generalizes all the preceding settings for which the existence of an
efﬁciency-permitting status quohas beenshown. Incontrast to Schweizer(2006),i ta l s o
describes a natural status quo that permits efﬁcient bargaining: the expected efﬁcient
decision. Moreover, the proof of the result is surprisingly simple.
Our general results apply more broadly, however, both to nonquasilinear envi-
ronments and to implementation of ex post inefﬁcient outcomes. For example, pre-
commitmenttoexpostinefﬁcientoutcomesmaybedesirableinstrategicsettings,when
incentives for ex ante investments need to be created, or when distributional or risk-
sharing concerns are present.
2. The general model and result
Let Y be the set of feasible allocations, assumed to be a measurable space (an allo-
cation may include monetary transfers). Let I be a ﬁnite set of agents. Each agent
i ∈ I privately observes his type θi, which is a realization of a random variable  θi in a
measurable space  i. The agents’ types are stochastically independent of each other.
We let   =  1 ×···× I.E a c h a g e n t i ∈ I is an expected utility maximizer, with a
measurable Bernoulli utility function ui:Y ×   → R. We consider the implementa-
tion of an allocation rule η:  → Y, which we restrict to be measurable and satisfyTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 111
supi∈I θ θ ∈ |ui(η(θ ) θ)| < ∞.2 By the Revelation Principle, we focus on the direct reve-
lation mechanism implementing allocation rule η.
Much of the literature has focused on settings with private values,i nw h i c hui(y θ)
depends on θ only through agent i’s type θi. Our results will apply not only to this case,
but also to more general settings with interdependent values in which allocation rules
satisfy the following property:
Definition 1. Allocation rule η is cross-congruent (CC) if for all i ∈ I and all θ 
i θi ∈  i,
for any random variable  θ−i that has the same distribution as  θ−i and is independent of
it, we have E[ui(η(θ 
i  θ−i) θi  θ−i)]≥E[ui(η(θ 
i   θ−i) θi  θ−i)].
In words, CC states that each agent i’s interim expected utility cannot be raised (re-
gardless of whether he reports truthfully) when each of the other agents switches from
truthfulreportingtorandomizingoverhisreportindependentlyofhistruetypebutwith
the correct distribution.3 With private values, any allocation rule is CC, since an agent
cares only about the other agents’ reports and not their true types, and so the inequality
in the deﬁnition holds with equality. Some interdependent-value settings in which CC
holds will be described in Section 3.2 below.
The Bayesian incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints in the direct revelation mech-
anism η take the form
E[ui(η(θi  θ−i) θi  θ−i)]≥E[ui(η(θ 
i  θ−i) θi  θ−i)] for all i ∈ I θi θ 
i ∈  i  (IC)
In general, we allow status quo allocations  y that are random variables on Y and
independent of the true state  θ. The agents’ (interim) individual rationality, or partici-
pation, constraints (IR) then take the form4
E[ui(η(θi  θ−i) θi  θ−i)]≥E[ui( y θi  θ−i)] for all i ∈ I θi ∈  i  (IR)
In some cases, instead of a randomized status quo, we can use a deterministic one,
which implements a given allocation from Y with probability 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the mechanism η satisﬁes IC and CC.
(a) Then mechanism η also satisﬁes IR when the status quo is the randomized allo-
cation  y that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation η( θ) in the
mechanism.
2These assumptions ensure that all the expectations below exist and Fubini’s Theorem (i.e., the law of
iterated expectations) applies. The boundedness assumption could be relaxed substantially.
3In particular, for a Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism η, this condition implies that each agent
prefers all the agents to report their types truthfully rather than to randomize over their reports with the
correct distributions but independently of the true types, which motivates the name “cross-congruence.”
4We follow the literature described in the Introduction by focusing on mechanisms in which any agent’s
refusaltoparticipateenforcesthestatusquo. Notethatifthemechanismcouldinsteadimposeexternalities
on nonparticipating agents (as in Segal 1999), this could relax the participation constraints.112 Segal and Whinston Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(b) If, in addition, the allocation space Y is a convex set in a topological vector space
and the Bernoulli utility function ui(y θ) of each agent i ∈ I is convex in the allo-
cation y ∈ Y for each state θ ∈  , then mechanism η also satisﬁes IR with the deter-
ministic status quo equalto theexpected equilibriumallocationin themechanism,
E[η( θ)].
Proof. For part (a), for all i ∈ I and θi ∈  i, letting   θ = (  θi   θ−i) be a random variable
equal in distribution to θ and independent of it, we can write
E[ui(η(θi  θ−i) θi  θ−i)]≥E[ui(η(  θi  θ−i) θi  θ−i)]
≥ E[ui(η(  θi   θ−i) θi  θ−i)]=E[ui( y θi  θ−i)] 
The ﬁrst inequality follows from IC, while the second inequality follows from CC.
Forpart(b),observeinadditionthatbyJensen’sinequalityanditeratedexpectations,
E[ui(η(  θ) θi  θ−i)]≥E[ui(E[η(  θ)] θi  θ−i)].  
In words, IC implies, in particular, that an agent of any given type could not gain by
misreporting his type randomly in a way that mimics his type distribution. Under CC,
his expected payoff could only be lowered further by replacing the other agents’ reports
with random draws from their distributions that are independent of their true types.
Thus, we obtain a randomized status quo that yields the same distribution over alloca-
tions as the equilibrium distribution of the mechanism and satisﬁes all of the partici-
pation constraints, proving Proposition 1(a). Proposition 1(b) allows us to replace the
randomized status quo with its expectation when the agents are weakly risk-loving with
respect to the allocation.
NotethatthestatusquoconstructedinProposition1(a)satisﬁesanyconstraintsthat
are satisﬁed by the mechanism itself. The same holds for the deterministic status quo
constructed in Proposition 1(b) for constraints that are convex and state-independent,
such as budget balance, resource nonwastefulness, or bounds on consumption or
transfers.
3. Application to bargaining in quasilinear environments
We now apply Proposition 1 to bargaining in quasilinear environments and, in partic-
ular, to the possibility of efﬁcient bargaining, as examined in the literature discussed
in the Introduction. For this purpose, we let the allocation space be Y = X × RI,
so that an allocation y = (x t) consists of a nonmonetary decision x ∈ X and a pro-
ﬁle t ∈ RI of monetary transfers to the agents. We say that a transfer vector t ∈ RI is
budget-balanced if

i∈I ti = 0. The utility of each agent i takes the quasilinear form
ui((x t) θ) = vi(x θ) + ti. We assume that X is a measurable space and that the func-
tions vi are measurable and uniformly bounded (i.e., supi∈I x∈X θ∈ |vi(x θ)| < ∞). The
total surplus from decision x in state θ is s(x θ) ≡

i∈I vi(x θ). A direct revelation
mechanism in this setting can be written as η =  χ τ ,w h e r eχ:  → X is the decision
rule and τ:  → RI is the transfer rule. We restrict both functions to be measurable andTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 113
the transfers τ to be bounded.5 Note that the satisfaction of property CC in the mecha-
nism  χ τ  is entirely determined by its decision rule χ.




s(x θ) for all θ ∈    (1)
InlinewiththeresultsofSection 2, webeginwith themoregeneralquestionconcerning
the possibility of implementing an arbitrary given decision rule χ in a mechanism that
is IC, IR, and, in addition, satisﬁes the budget-balance (BB) condition

i∈I
τi(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈    (BB)
Following the insight of Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979),
starting with any IC mechanism  χ τ , we can construct another IC mechanism  χ τ 
that also satisﬁes (BB), by taking the new transfers to be





E[τj(θj  θ−j)]  (2)
Furthermore, if the decision rule χ satisﬁes CC, then Proposition 1(a) yields a random-
ized status quo for which mechanism (χ τ) also satisﬁes IR. Finally, under convexity of
agents’utilitiesinthedecisionandofthedecisionspaceX,Proposition1(b)impliesthat
IR can be satisﬁed with a deterministic status quo (ˆ x  ˆ t)specifying decision ˆ x = E[χ( θ)].
Note that since the mechanism (χ τ) satisﬁes BB,t h es t a t u sq u ot r a n s f e r sˆ t obtained in
this way are budget-balanced as well.
Now we establish a somewhat stronger result: the deterministic status quo ˆ x =
E[χ( θ)] can be used under the weaker assumption that only the total surplus s(x θ) is
convex in the decision. We do so in a manner designed to facilitate comparison to the
existing literature, which is discussed further in Section 4. We begin with the following
deﬁnition.
Definition 2. Status quo decision ˆ x ∈ X sustains decision rule χ in bargaining if there
exists an IC BB mechanism  χ τ  that satisﬁes IR for some status quo allocation (ˆ x  ˆ t)
with budget-balanced transfers ˆ t ∈ RI. Status quo decision ˆ x ∈ X permits efﬁcient bar-
gaining if it sustains an efﬁcient decision rule χ∗ in bargaining.
Note that it does not matter which budget-balanced status quo transfers ˆ t are used
in the deﬁnition, since the mechanism’s transfer rule τ can always be adjusted to ˆ τi(θ) =
τi(θ) − ˆ ti to preserve BB and IC and satisfy IR for the status quo (ˆ x 0). Hence for deﬁ-
niteness, we focus on status quos with no transfers.
5These restrictions ensure the existence of the expectations and the inﬁmum below.114 Segal and Whinston Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Given an IC mechanism  χ τ ,f o ra n yˆ x ∈ X and ˆ θ = (ˆ θ1     ˆ θI) ∈  ,d e ﬁ n e




E[vi(χ(ˆ θi  θ−i)  ˆ θi  θ−i)+τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)]−E[vi(ˆ x  ˆ θi  θ−i)]−E[τi( θ)]

(3)
π χ τ (ˆ x) ≡ inf
ˆ θ∈ 
π χ τ (ˆ x  ˆ θ) 
The function π χ τ (ˆ x  ˆ θ) can be interpreted as the expected proﬁt of an interme-
diary who runs the mechanism  χ τ , incurring expected cost E[τi( θ)] for each
agent i, and charges each agent i a participation fee (E[vi(χ(ˆ θi  θ−i)  ˆ θi) + τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)]−
E[vi(ˆ x  ˆ θi  θ−i)]) that makes his type ˆ θi indifferent between participating in the mecha-
nism and getting the status quo (ˆ x 0). The function π χ τ (ˆ x) is therefore the expected
proﬁt of an intermediary who runs mechanism  χ τ  with status quo (ˆ x 0) and charges
the maximal participation fees that assure participation of all types.
We begin with a lemma that has a number of (more restrictive) precedents for efﬁ-
cient decision rules:6
Lemma 1. If  χ τ  is an IC mechanism and ˆ x ∈ X satisﬁes π χ τ (ˆ x) ≥ 0, then status quo
decision ˆ x sustains decision rule χ in bargaining.
Proof.L e t (χ τ) be the IC BB mechanism with transfers (2). For each i ∈ I and each
θ ∈  ,l e t












vi(χ(ˆ θi  θ−i)  ˆ θi  θ−i)+τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)

−E[vi(ˆ x  ˆ θi  θ−i)]

 
Mechanism  χ  ˆ τ  inherits IC and BB from mechanism (χ τ), and satisﬁes IR for status
quo (ˆ x 0) by construction of Ki and the fact that

j∈I
Kj = π χ τ (ˆ x) = π χ τ (ˆ x) ≥ 0 
(The ﬁrst equality holds since transfers τ satisfy (BB), and the second equality holds
since by (2), we have E[τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)−τi( θ)]=E[τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)−τi( θ)].)  
We now use this lemma along with Proposition 1 to establish a possibility result.
6Precedents can be found, e.g., in Makowski and Mezzetti (1994), Krishna and Perry (1998), Neeman
(1999), Williams (1999), Schweizer (2006), Che (2006), and Figueroa and Skreta (2007). However, these
precedents focus on efﬁcient decision rules, and make restrictive assumptions on type spaces and utility
functions to show that the condition is necessary as well as sufﬁcient for implementing efﬁcient outcomes.
(We state such a necessity result in Lemma 3 below.)Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 115
Proposition 2. Suppose that the decision space X is a convex set in a topological vector
space and the total surplus s(x θ) is convex in the decision x ∈ X for each state θ ∈  .
Then if decision rule χ is implementable in an IC mechanism that satisﬁes CC, the status
quo decision equal to the expected equilibrium decision E[χ( θ)] sustains χ in bargaining.
Proof.L e t  χ τ  beanICandCCmechanism,andlet( x  t)bearandomvariableequal
indistributionto(χ( θ) τ( θ))andindependentofit. Theconvexityof s(x θ)inximplies
that for any ˆ θ ∈  , π χ τ (ˆ x  ˆ θ) is concave in ˆ x, and therefore by Jensen’s inequality,







vi(χ(ˆ θi  θ−i)  ˆ θi  θ−i)+τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)

−E[vi( x  ˆ θi  θ−i)]−E[ ti]

 
w h e r ew eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tE[ ti]=E[τi( θ)]. Each summation term is nonnegative by
Proposition 1(a), since it can be viewed as the expected utility of agent i’s type ˆ θi in the
mechanism  χ τ  net of his expected utility at the randomized status quo ( x  t). Apply
Lemma 1.  
3.1 Application to private values
In the case of private values, in which utilities take the form vi(x θi), any efﬁcient de-
cision rule (1) can be implemented in a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct





vj(χ∗(θ) θj)  (4)
Furthermore,intheprivate-valuessetting,anydecisionruletriviallysatisﬁesCC.Hence,
Proposition 2 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there are private values, the decision space X is a convex set
in a topological vector space, and the total surplus s(x θ) is convex in the decision x ∈ X
for each state θ ∈  .T h e ni fχ∗ is an efﬁcient decision rule, the status quo decision equal
to the expected efﬁcient decision ˆ x = E[χ∗( θ)] permits efﬁcient bargaining.
For example, in the symmetric partnership model of Cramton et al. (1987), equal
ownership shares is the expected efﬁcient decision and Corollary 1 tells us that this sta-
tus quo decision permits efﬁcient bargaining, consistent with their results. More gen-
erally, any symmetric model has a symmetric expected efﬁcient decision, and under
the corollary’s convexity assumptions, this status quo permits efﬁcient bargaining, as in
Yenmez (2007) and Gershkov and Schweinzer (2010).
3.2 Application to interdependent values
The case of interdependent values involves two complications: an efﬁcient decision
rule (a) need not be implementable in an IC mechanism (as noted, e.g., by Jehiel and116 Segal and Whinston Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Moldovanu 2001) and (b) need not satisfy CC. However, in the special case of one-
dimensional types, there exist simple “single-crossing” conditions that ensure CC and
IC implementability.7
Lemma 2. Suppose that  i ⊆ R for each i ∈ I, then the following results hold.
(a) Any decision rule χ such that for each i ∈ I, vi(χ(θ 
i θ−i) θi θ−i) has increasing
differences in (θ 
i θi) ∈  i × i for all θ−i ∈  −i, is implementable in an IC mecha-
nism.
(b) Any mechanism  χ τ  such that for all i j ∈ I with j  = i, vi(χ(θ 
j θ 
−j) θj θ−j) has
increasing differences in (θ 
j θj) ∈  j × j for all θ 
−j θ−j ∈  −j, is CC.
Proof. For part (a), ﬁx an agent i ∈ I and θ−i ∈  −i. Consider a single-agent environ-
ment with decision space  i, decision rule ˆ χi: i →  i given by ˆ χi(θi) = θi,a n dt h e
agent’s utility function ˆ vi(θ 
i θi) = vi(χ(θ 
i θ−i) θi θ−i). The decision rule ˆ χi is increas-
ing and ˆ vi(θ 
i θi) has increasing differences by assumption. Hence, by Rochet’s (1987)
Proposition 1, there exists a transfer rule τi(· θ−i): i → R that satisﬁes the agent’s in-
centive constraints in this single-agent environment, which can be written as8
vi(χ(θi θ−i) θi θ−i)+τi(θi θ−i) ≥ vi(χ(θ 
i θ−i) θi θ−i)+τi(θ 
i θ−i)
for all θi θ 
i ∈  i 
Putting these transfer rules together (for all θ−i ∈  −i and all i ∈ I) yields a mechanism
 χ τ  that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and therefore IC.
For part (b), apply logic similar to that in part (a) to an agent i ∈ I who observes the
type θj ofanotheragent j ∈ I \{i} ratherthanhisowntype θi. Theargumentimpliesthat
for any ﬁxed θ−j θ 
−j ∈  −j, the decision rule χ(· θ 
−j): j → X is implementable with
some transfer rule ˆ τi(· θ−j θ 
−j): j → R, i.e.,
vi(χ(θj θ 
−j) θj θ−j)+ˆ τi(θj θ−j θ 
−j) ≥ vi(χ(θ 
j θ 
−j) θj θ−j)+ˆ τi(θ 
j θ−j θ 
−j)
for all θj θ 
j ∈  j 
Now, let  θ−j be a random variable with the same distribution as  θ−j but independent of
it. Taking a subset T ⊆ I \{i} of agents, substitute θ = (θi  θ−i) and θ  = (θ 
i  θT   θI\(T∪{i}))
in the above inequality, and take expectations to obtain (note that the expectations of
transfers cancel out since random variables   θj and  θj have the same distribution and
are independent of the other variables)
E[vi(χ(θ 
i  θT∪{j}   θI\(T∪{i j})) θi  θ−i)]≥E[vi(χ(θ 
i  θT   θI\(T∪{i})) θi  θ−i)] 
7Below we use the concepts of (strictly) increasing differences, supermodularity, and lattices, whose de-
ﬁnitions can be found in Topkis (1998).
8Rochet’s (1987) Proposition 1 assumes that the agent’s utility function is twice continuously differen-
tiable and his type space is a closed interval, but it is clear from his proof that these assumptions are not
needed. The sufﬁciency part of his proposition, which we use here, relies only on the increasing difference
property of the agent’s utility function (the necessity part uses the stronger property of strictly increasing
differences).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 117
This means that E[vi(χ(θ 
i  θT   θI\(T∪{i})) θi  θ−i)] is nondecreasing in T ⊆ I \{ i}.C o m -
paring T = ∅ to T = I \{i} yields CC.  
While both parts of Lemma 2 have precedents in the literature, we state them in
greatergeneralityandhighlightaconnectionbetweenthem. Part(a)ofthelemmastates
that increasing differences in agents’ utilities between their true and reported types en-
sure implementability, which extends an observation of García (2005) (discarding un-
necessary assumptions such as smoothness of utility functions and connectedness of
type spaces). The derivation of part (b) applies the same approach to hypothetical sit-
uations in which agent i observes and reports the type θj of another agent j  = i rather
than his own type. Increasing differences between the report θ 
j and the true type θj
in agent i’s utility imply that his truthful reporting of θj could be sustained by some
transfers. In turn, using an observation of Rahman (2010, Theorem 1), this implies that
agent i’s expected nonmonetary utility could not be improved by any randomized “un-
detectable deviation,” i.e., deviation to a randomized reporting strategy in which his re-
port θ 
j has the same distribution as the true type θj. This explains the satisfaction of CC
in this setting.9
Lemma 2 together with Proposition 2 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the decision space X is a convex set in a topological vector
space and the total surplus s(x θ) is convex in the decision x ∈ X for each state θ ∈  ,
and that  i ⊆ R for each i ∈ I. Then for any decision rule χ such that for all i j ∈ I,
vi(χ(θ ) θ) hasincreasingdifferencesin (θ 
j θj) ∈  j × j forall θ 
−j θ−j ∈  −j,t h es t a t u s
quo decision equal to the expected equilibrium decision E[χ( θ)] sustains χ in bargaining.
The following example describes a setting with interdependent values in which the
desiredincreasingdifferenceconditionsaresatisﬁedbyanefﬁcientdecisionrule,sothat
Corollary 2 establishes the possibility of efﬁcient bargaining.
Example 1. LetX ={ x ∈ RI
+:

i∈I xi = 1},w h e r exi is interpreted as agent i’s consump-
tion of a good whose total supply is 1 and, for all i ∈ I,  i ⊆ R and vi(x θ) = φi(θ)xi,
where φi:  → R is a differentiable function. Consider ﬁrst the case of I = 2,a n d
suppose that for each i = 1 2, ∂φi(θ)/∂θi − ∂φ−i(θ)/∂θi > 0. Then an efﬁcient de-
cision rule χ∗
i (θ) is nondecreasing in θi and nonincreasing in θ−i. If, furthermore,
∂φi(θ)/∂θi ≥ 0 ≥ ∂φ−i(θ)/∂θi for each i, decision rule χ∗ satisﬁes the increasing differ-
ence conditions of Corollary 2.10 Since the surplus s(x θ) is linear in the decision x
and the decision set X is convex, the status quo decision equal to the expected efﬁcient
decision E[χ∗( θ)] permits efﬁcient bargaining.
This conclusion extends to the case of I>2 agents whose values take the separa-
ble form φi(θ) = gi(θi)+

j∈I\{i}hj(θj). In this case, efﬁciency (1)m e a n st h a tχ∗
i (θ) > 0
9An alternative explanation of CC follows from a property of supermodular functions noted by Milgrom
and Roberts (1995, p. 186).
10Namely, χ∗
i (θ) being nondecreasing in θi and ∂φi(θ)/∂θi ≥ 0 imply the condition of Lemma 2(a),
which ensures that χ∗ is implementable in an IC mechanism, while χ∗
i (θ) being nonincreasing in θ−i and
∂φ−i(θ)/∂θi ≤ 0 imply the condition of Lemma 2(b), which ensures that the mechanism is CC.118 Segal and Whinston Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
only for i ∈ argmaxj∈J[gj(θj) − hj(θj)].T h u s ,w h e ng 
i >h  
i for all i ∈ I, there again exists
an efﬁcient decision rule χ∗ in which χ∗
i (θ) is nondecreasing in θi and nonincreasing in
θ−i. (For the latter monotonicity, tie-breaking should not depend on the types of agents
who do not get the object.) If, furthermore, g 
i ≥ 0 ≥ h 
i for all i ∈ I, then the decision
rule χ∗ satisﬁes the increasing difference assumptions of Corollary 2. Since the convex-
ity assumptions of Corollary 2 also hold, the status quo decision equal to the expected
efﬁcient decision E[χ∗( θ)] permits efﬁcient bargaining. ♦
The conclusion of the separable part of Example 1 generalizes Theorem 3 of Fieseler
et al. (2003), which shows that in the symmetric version of the example, the symmetric
status quo (1/|I|     1/|I|) permits efﬁcient bargaining. The example can also be used
todemonstratetheimportanceofCCfortheexistenceofanefﬁciency-permittingstatus
quo. Namely, Fieseler et al. (2003, Theorem 4) show that in the symmetric version of the
separable case of Example 1,w h e ng  >h   > 0, there exists a distribution over types for
which no status quo permits efﬁcient bargaining. In this case, all of the assumptions
of Corollary 2 except for CC are satisﬁed by an efﬁcient decision rule (in particular, it is
implementable in an IC mechanism, as noted in footnote 10).11
Example 1 can alsobe used to interpret CC. Observe thatthe condition can be inter-
preted as saying that a “naive” agent who knows the distribution of others’ messages but
believes these messages to be independent of their types underestimates his expected
utility in the mechanism (for any type observed and any message sent). (This concept
of naivete is examined by Eyster and Rabin 2005, who study its behavioral effects, in
contrast to our analysis.) In Example 1, a naive agent i believes his expected value for a
received good to be E[φi(θi  θ−i)], failing to condition the expectation on the fact that
he receives the good only when other agents observe sufﬁciently low signals  θ−i.T h u s ,
when φi(θ) is decreasing in θ−i, so CC holds, a naive agent who receives the good is,
on average, pleasantly surprised by its value to him. This situation can be referred to as
winner’s blessing (see Fieseler et al. 2001), in contrast to the more familiar winner’s curse
case in which φi(θ) is increasing in θ−i and so a naive agent is, on average, negatively
surprised by the received good’s value. Thus, condition CC, which postulates excessive
pessimism of naive agents, can be viewed as a formalization of winner’s blessing for
general mechanism design settings.
In contrast to the special setting of Example 1, the satisfaction of CC (and thus
the possibility of efﬁcient bargaining) is not generally determined by agents’ marginal
utilities for the decision being nonincreasing in the others’ types. For an illustration,
consider the following example, in which marginal utilities for decisions are increas-
ing in others’ types, yet an efﬁcient decision rule satisﬁes CC and efﬁcient bargaining is
possible.
Example 2. Suppose that X is a lattice,  i ⊆ R for all i ∈ I,e a c ha g e n ti’s utility vi(x θ)
has increasing differences in (x θ), and the total surplus s(x θ) has strictly increasing
differences in (x θ) and is supermodular in x ∈ X in each state θ ∈  . (This setting can
11A related asymmetric example with one-sided private information violating CC in which no status quo
permits efﬁcient bargaining is offered by Jehiel and Pauzner (2006) in their Corollary 3(iii).Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 119
be interpreted as provision of a public good or a set of complementary public goods,
with types raising all agents’ incremental utilities for all the goods.) Then by Topkis
(1998, Theorem 2.8.4), any efﬁcient decision rule χ∗ is nondecreasing, which implies
the increasing difference conditions of Corollary 2. Hence, if the convexity conditions of
Corollary 2 hold as well, then the status quo decision equal to the expected efﬁcient de-
cision E[χ∗( θ)] permits efﬁcientbargaining. (Forexample, all of therequired conditions
hold when X is a convex sublattice of Rm, and for each i ∈ I, vi(x θ) = φi(θ) · x,w h e r e
φi:  → Rm is a strictly increasing function.) ♦
4. Remarks
In this section, we make a few remarks on our results, concentrating on the special case
ofquasilinearenvironmentswithprivatevaluesstudiedinSection 3,whichhasbeenthe
focus of most of the literature.
4.1 Comparison to Schweizer’s (2006) Proposition 2
Our derivation of Proposition 2 can be interpreted as follows. Fix an IC and CC mech-
anism  χ τ  and consider the zero-sum game in which an “intermediary” chooses the
status quo decision ˆ x ∈ X to maximize π χ τ (ˆ x  ˆ θ) in (3) and an “adversary” chooses the
“critical types” ˆ θ ∈   to minimize it. According to Lemma 1, if status quo decision ˆ x
guarantees the intermediary a nonnegative payoff regardless of the adversary’s action,
thenitsustainsdecisionruleχinbargaining. Now,byrandomizingoverstatusquodeci-
sions with the same distribution as the equilibrium decision rule χ( θ), the intermediary
guarantees himself a nonnegative expected payoff, since by Proposition 1(a), the inter-
mediary’sexpectedproﬁtoneachagent—givenby theexpectationofthecorresponding
summation term in (3)—would be nonnegative at any ˆ θ ∈  . Finally, if the intermedi-
ary’s payoff is concave in ˆ x [which is true if s(x θ) is convex] and his choice set X is
convex, the randomization can be replaced with its expectation E[χ( θ)] without reduc-
ing the intermediary’s expected payoff. Therefore, by Lemma 1,t h es t a t u sq u oE[χ( θ)]
sustains decision rule χ in bargaining.
Schweizer (2006) focuses on the private-value setting and an efﬁcient decision
rule (1), which is then implementable in the VCG mechanism η∗ =  χ∗ τ∗  with trans-
fers (4). In this case, letting S(θ) ≡ maxx∈X s(x θ), the intermediary’s payoff (3)c a nb e
written as
πη∗(ˆ x  ˆ θ) =− (|I|−1)E[S( θ)]+

i∈I
E[S(ˆ θi  θ−i)]−s(ˆ x  ˆ θ)  (5)
He makes a number of assumptions to ensure that the resulting simultaneous zero-
sum game between the intermediary and the adversary has a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium—a “saddle point” (ˆ x◦  ˆ θ◦).I n t h i s c a s e , s t r a t e g yˆ x◦ is the intermediary’s
“maximin” strategy and guarantees him at least the saddle-point payoff πη∗(ˆ x◦  ˆ θ◦) re-
gardless of the adversary’s action (Rockafellar 1970). Schweizer then shows that the
saddle-point payoff is nonnegative, a conclusion that can also be seen from the ob-
servation that the intermediary cannot improve upon the saddle-point payoff by any120 Segal and Whinston Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
mixed strategy, in particular by the randomization χ( θ), which would guarantee him
a nonnegative payoff by Proposition 1(a). Hence, by Lemma 1, status quo ˆ x◦ permits
efﬁcient bargaining.
To ensure the existence of a saddle point, Schweizer makes stronger assumptions
than those of our Proposition 2. In addition to our assumptions, he assumes that the
total surplus is linear in θ [which ensures that the payoff (5) is convex in the adver-
sary’s action ˆ θ], that the adversary’s choice set   is convex, and that the sets X and  
are compact subsets of Euclidean spaces, and also makes some continuity assump-
tions.12 Our approach dispenses with the extra assumptions—in particular, we allow
for inﬁnite-dimensional decisions or types, nonconvex or noncompact type spaces, and
utility functions that are nonlinear or discontinuous. The only indispensable assump-
tions prove to be convexity of the total surplus in the decision and of the decision set X
(and even these assumptions are not needed if a randomized status quo is allowed).
A second and perhaps more important advantage of our approach is our explicit de-
scription of a natural status quo that permits efﬁcient bargaining: the expected efﬁcient
decision.13
Ontheotherhand,Schweizer’ssaddle-pointstatusquoor,moregenerally,the“max-
imin” status quo, which maximizes the intermediary’s expected proﬁt, is of some inde-
pendent interest. This expected proﬁt-maximizing status quo generally differs from the
expected equilibrium decision, as we illustrate in Example 3 below. For analyzing this
example, we write the two best-response conditions that characterize a saddle point
(ˆ x◦  ˆ θ◦) of the intermediary’s payoff (3) in a general mechanism  χ τ  for private-value






vi(χ(ˆ θi  θ−i)  ˆ θi)+τi(ˆ θi  θ−i)−vi(ˆ x◦  ˆ θi)

for all i ∈ I (6)
ˆ x◦ ∈ argmin
ˆ x∈X
s(ˆ x  ˆ θ◦)  (7)
Condition (6) says that the adversary chooses each agent i’s critical type ˆ θ◦
i to minimize
the agent’s net expected surplus over the status quo decision ˆ x◦ in mechanism  χ τ ,
while(7)saysthattheintermediarychoosesstatusquodecision ˆ x◦ tominimize thetotal
surplus at the critical types ˆ θ◦.
Example 3. Suppose that I = 2,e a c h θi is distributed on  i =[ 0 1] according to
a strictly increasing cumulative distribution function Fi, the decision space is X =
12His footnotes 1 and 2 state some continuity and smoothness assumptions, although they could be
relaxed for the purpose of proving the existence of a saddle point.
13Thesaddle-pointstatusquodecision ˆ x◦ doesofferoneadvantagewhenmechanism χ τ isdominant-
strategy incentive compatible (as is the VCG mechanism η∗ considered by Schweizer): By using trans-
fers ˆ τi(θ|ˆ x) = τi(θ) − ([vi(χ(ˆ θ◦
i  θ−i)  ˆ θ◦
i) − τi(ˆ θ◦
i θ−i)]−vi(ˆ x  ˆ θ◦
i)) with ˆ x = ˆ x◦, the intermediary guaran-
tees a nonnegative budget surplus not just in expectation, but in every state θ. Indeed, by the saddle-
point condition (7) below and the dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of  χ τ ,

i∈I ˆ τi(θ|ˆ x◦) ≤ 
i∈I ˆ τi(θ|χ(θ)) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈  . Furthermore, unlike the balanced-budget mechanism constructed in the
proof of Lemma 1, the mechanism  χ  ˆ τ  inherits the dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of  χ τ .
Note, however, that the mechanism  χ  ˆ τ  would generally satisfy all of the participation constraints with
status quo decision ˆ x◦ only in expectation, not in the ex post sense.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 121
{(x1 x2) ∈ R2
+:x1 + x2 = 1},a n dvi(x θi) = θixi. Consider any efﬁcient decision rule (1),
which has χ∗
i (θ) = 1 whenever θi >θ −i. In this setting there is a unique saddle point,
which is found as follows: Given a status quo decision ˆ x◦ = (ˆ x◦
1  ˆ x◦
2), condition (6)i ss a t -
isﬁed only by the types ˆ θ◦
i whose expected consumption equals ˆ x◦
i (any other type can
obtain a strictly greater interim net expected utility than that of type ˆ θ◦
i by pretending
to be type ˆ θ◦
i). With the efﬁcient decision rule, this means that F−i(ˆ θ◦
i) = ˆ x◦
i.T os a t i s f y
condition (7), we must have ˆ θ◦
1 = ˆ θ◦
2 [unless ˆ x◦
i = 1 for some i and ˆ θ◦
i < ˆ θ◦
−i ≤ 1,b u tt h i s
contradicts the previous condition F−i(ˆ θ◦
i) = ˆ x◦
i = 1]. The equation F1(ˆ θ◦) + F2(ˆ θ◦) = 1
then uniquely deﬁnes the saddle-point types ˆ θ◦
1 = ˆ θ◦
2 = ˆ θ◦ and the status quo decision
ˆ x◦ = (F2(ˆ θ◦) F1(ˆ θ◦)). [This decision was used, for example, by Schmitz (2002) in prov-
ing his Proposition 3.] Note that this status quo decision does not change if we perturb
F1 and F2 in ways that keep F1(ˆ θ◦) and F2(ˆ θ◦) ﬁxed, but such perturbations generally
alter the expected efﬁcient decision E[χ∗( θ)]. ♦
4.2 Deterministic status quo without convexity
When the assumptions of Proposition 2—convexity of the total surplus s(x θ) in the
decision x and of the decision set X—do not hold, there may not exist a deterministic
status quo decision that sustains an IC implementable decision rule χ in bargaining. To
understand these settings, we ﬁrst note that for certain classical settings, a converse to
Lemma 1 also holds.
Lemma 3. Suppose that, in a private-value setting, for each agent i,  i is a smoothly
connectedsubsetofaEuclideanspaceandvi(x θi)isdifferentiableinθi,withthegradient
∇θivi(x θi) bounded on X ×  . Suppose that mechanism  χ τ  is IC. Then status quo
decision ˆ x ∈ X sustains decision rule χ in bargaining if and only if π χ τ (ˆ x) ≥ 0.
Proof. The “if” statement is by Lemma 1. For the “only if” statement, note that by
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (see, e.g., Milgrom and Segal 2002, Section 3.1),
the expected budget surplus in any IC mechanism that implements decision rule χ in
which the IR of each agent i’s type ˆ θi holds is bounded above by (3). Thus, the ex-
pected budget surplus in any IC IR mechanism that implements χ is bounded above
by infˆ θ∈ π χ τ (ˆ x  ˆ θ) = π χ τ (ˆ x). If this value is negative, the mechanism cannot sat-
isfy (BB).  
We now use Lemma 3 to examine the possibility of efﬁcient bargaining in some ex-
amples with nonconvexities. For a famous example where there is no deterministic
status quo decision permitting efﬁcient bargaining, take Example 3 with the decision
space restricted to the nonconvex set X ={ (1 0) (0 1)}. Impossibility of efﬁcient bar-
gainingforeitherstatusquodecisionisestablishedbytheMyerson–SatterthwaiteTheo-
rem (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983). Formally, for status quo decision ˆ x = (ˆ xi  ˆ x−i) =
(1 0), the critical types (6)a r eˆ θ◦
i(ˆ x) = 1 and ˆ θ◦
−i(ˆ x) = 0, so in calculating (5), we have122 Segal and Whinston Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
S(ˆ θ◦
i(ˆ x) θ−i) = 1 = s(ˆ x  ˆ θ) and S(ˆ θ◦
−i(ˆ x) θi) = θi. This yields πη∗(ˆ x) = πη∗(ˆ x  ˆ θ◦(ˆ x)) =
−E[S( θ)− θi] < 0.14
We now consider some settings with a convex decision space X, but where the total
surplus s(x θ) is not convex in the decision x. (Most classical settings assume concave
payoffs, reﬂecting diminishing marginal returns.) Neeman (1999, p. 685), for instance,
offers an example with concave payoffs, in which there is no deterministic status quo
decision that permits efﬁcient bargaining. Yet, in some concave settings, the expected
efﬁcient status quo decision still permits efﬁcient bargaining.
Example 4. Suppose that X = RK and for each i,  i ⊆ RK, E[ θi]=0,a n dvi(x θi) =
θi · x − (1/|I|) x 2.15 Then the efﬁcient decision rule is χ∗(θ) =





i∈I θi 2. Given a status quo decision ˆ x,( 6)i ss o l v e db yt y p eˆ θ◦
i(ˆ x) = ˆ x for each i,
and using the statistical independence of agents’ types, we can calculate
πη∗(ˆ x) = πη∗(ˆ x  ˆ θ◦(ˆ x)) =−1
2(|I|−1) ˆ x 2 
This function is strictly concave in ˆ x and is maximized at ˆ x = 0, the expected efﬁcient
decision, which yields value zero. Thus, by Lemma 3, the expected efﬁcient decision
E[χ∗( θ)]=0 is the unique status quo decision that permits efﬁcient bargaining. ♦
However, as the discussion at the end of the previous subsection indicates, an
expected efﬁcient decision generally does not maximize the intermediary’s expected
proﬁt. As a result, with concave payoffs, efﬁciency may be possible with some status
quo decision, but not with an expected efﬁcient decision.
Example 5. Let I = 2 and let  i = X =[ 0 1] for i = 1 2. Suppose also that v1(x θ1) =
−θ1−a
1 xa/a and v2(x θ2) = θ
1−1/a
2 x,w i t ha>1. (Agent 1 is the “seller,” agent 2 is the
“buyer,” and x is the buyer’s purchase.) Then the efﬁcient decision rule is χ∗(θ) = θ1θ
1/a
2
and S(θ)= ((a − 1)/a)θ1θ2. Given a status quo decision ˆ x,( 6)i ss o l v e db yt y p e sˆ θ◦
1(ˆ x) =
E[ θ2]−1/aˆ x and ˆ θ◦
2(ˆ x) = E[ θ1]−aˆ xa,a n ds o
πη∗(ˆ x) = πη∗(ˆ x  ˆ θ◦(ˆ x)) =−
1
a






E[ θ2]E[ θ1] 
Thisfunctionisstrictlyconcavein ˆ xandismaximizedat ˆ x◦ = E[ θ1]E[ θ2]1/a,whichyields
value zero. Thus, by Lemma3, ˆ x◦ is theunique statusquo decision thatpermits efﬁcient
bargaining. In particular, efﬁcient bargaining is not permitted by the expected efﬁcient
status quo decision E[χ∗( θ)]=E[ θ1]E[( θ2)1/a] < ˆ x◦ (by Jensen’s inequality). ♦
14For other examples with a nonconvex decision space X in which there is no deterministic status quo
that permits efﬁcient bargaining, see Ornelas and Turner (2007) and Turner (2008).
15Where  x 2 = x·x. The conclusion of this example extends to any setting in which the agents’ utilities
are linear-quadratic in (θ x) and the total surplus s(x θ) is strictly concave in x. Indeed, any such setting
can be transformed into the model in the example using afﬁne transformations of x and θ, and adding
baseline decision-dependent transfers.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Status quo that ensures participation 123
4.3 Relation to holdup models
Suppose agents ﬁrst choose unobservable ex ante investments, with each agent i’s pri-
vate investment choice ai ∈ Ai determining the distribution of his type  θi. (Any invest-
ment costs can be subsumed into utilities.) Let a∗ = (a∗
1     a∗
I) be an efﬁcient invest-
ment proﬁle, i.e., one that maximizes the expected total surplus E[S( θ)|a]. Rogerson
(1992, Proposition 2) shows that if, following the realizations of agents’ types, the agents
participate in an “expected externality” mechanism in which all expectations are taken
conditionalontheefﬁcientinvestmentproﬁlea∗,thisproﬁleissustainedasaNashequi-
librium of the ex ante investment game. Using our Corollary 1, the mechanism can also
satisfy the interim participation constraints (if quitting is possible after investments are
taken and agents observe their own types) when the status quo equals the expected efﬁ-
cient decision E[χ∗( θ)|a∗]. (Moregenerally, any status quo thatsatisﬁes thecondition in
Lemma 1 can be used.) Note that each agent i’s IR and IC constraints will be satisﬁed for
any realization of his type θi, provided that the other agents have made efﬁcient invest-
ments a∗
−i. Thus, the strategies in which each agent i invests a∗
i , and (regardless of his
investment) participates in the mechanism and reports truthfully for each realized θi,
form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism. In an optimistic scenario, we
could think of the agents specifying only the expected efﬁcient decision as the status
quo in the ex ante contract—if they then expect to bargain according to the mechanism,
they will choose efﬁcient investments and achieve an efﬁcient allocation.
Theuseofanexpectedefﬁcientdecisionasthestatusquoisreminiscentoftheresult
of Edlin and Reichelstein (1996). They show that in a two-agent holdup model in which
agentsengageinfull-informationNashbargainingovertradeuponobservingnonveriﬁ-
able investments and values, such a status quo sustains efﬁcient investments in equilib-
rium, provided that payoffs satisfy a separability condition. Our result, however, is for-
mally quite distinct: e.g., the investments here are unobservable, our bargaining mech-
anism is quite different from Nash bargaining, and the assumptions of convexity and
separability are not nested.
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